It's at this point that I start to ha e my doubts

But while Layard's argument may be alid with the bene it o hindsight, it is otherwise specious. A utilitarian li ing in ancient Greece would ha e been hard-pressed to decide which o the many philosophers at the time was likely to be the great thinker as opposed to the stupid kna e.And that, I think, is the problem with making happiness a central part o public policy. He re used to belie e that a satis ied ool was a greater utilitarian success than a dissatis ied Socrates. Layard thinks Mill was wrong to worry: "We ha e to allow or the results o Socrates' work - and the millions o people whose happiness it has increased".

Whose happiness should be our concern: ours, our children's or the happiness o generations yet to come? E en i we did know the answer, who makes the judgement about appropriate orms o happiness (is it good or bad to be on Prozac)?JS Mill didn't think all orms o happiness were equi alent. That may be true in Europe, but Layard is more worried about unhappiness in the United States, where church attendance is both high and rising.We also ha e di erent iews o how to plan or the uture. At one point in his book, Layard notes the demise o religious belie s, saying "the decline o orthodox Christianity .. has le t a moral acuum". Yet Britain would not be the country it is without a constant in lux o immigrants, whether they be Normans, Jews, Huguenots, Italians, Germans, West Indians or Muslims. I'm not sure I could quanti y the degree o happiness that has been generated rom this in lux, but there's no doubt Britain would ha e been a ery di erent country without it.More generally, the utilitarian calculus too o ten ails because we all ha e di erent iews o what makes us happy and, indeed, o what makes society happy. Because o this, Europeans should think twice be ore they embrace the US model o labour mobility and immigration.This argument can too easily become a protectionist re rain, with incumbent communities re using to embrace new entrants, where er they might ha e come rom.

In his book, though, Lord Layard extols the irtues o community. A well- unctioning community where people know each other has high le els o trust whereas geographical mobility "increases amily break-up and criminality". The pursuit o a happy society seems like a worthwhile goal, but who de ines the boundaries o this happy society? Many economists think geographical mobility is a good thing because people are able to mo e rom where they are less producti e to where they are more producti e. Ne ertheless, we know a lot more about happiness now than we did in the past and that's enough or Layard to suggest that policymakers should place greater ocus on, or example, the distribution o income (because those who are poorer alue each marginal dollar more than others) than on its o erall le el.It's at this point that I start to ha e my doubts. As another example, per ect competition can be seen as a model by which to judge the economic per ormance o the real world, in luencing our attitudes towards market ailures o one kind or another.O course, policymakers ine itably end up with a ocus on things that can be measured (like national income), while putting to one side things that can't easily be measured (like happiness).